Inequality aversion and using forest as a common pool resource

• Autorzy: Ostaszewicz K. , Ledzianowski J.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The aim of the paper is to investigate the models of forest use as a common-pool resource, with users driven by three different motivations: egoistic one, inequality-aversion and forest-sensitivity. The stationary states of the forest were found analytically for pure strategies and numerically for mixed communities. It was shown that the communities of forest-sensitive and inequality-averse individuals are to some degree stable against intruding breaking rules players. However, this stability breaks down for a certain percent of breaking rules individuals, and the stationary state of the forest may change with this percent quite abruptly.

• Wydawca: -
• Czasopismo: Intercathedra
• Rocznik: 2016
• Tom: 32
• Numer: 2
• Opis fizyczny: p.54-63,fig.,ref.

Twórcy

autor

Ostaszewicz K.

• Wroclaw University of Economics, Wroclaw, Poland

autor

Ledzianowski J.

• General Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wroclaw, Poland

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