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2013 | 22 | 3 |

Tytuł artykułu

Carbon emission allowances of efficiency analysis: application of super SBM ZSG-DEA model

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Języki publikacji



Our study analyzes the emission allowances of 24 European Union (EU) members from a sample taken from 2005-07. A Super Slacks-Based Measure Zero Sum Gains Data Envelopment Analysis (Super SBM-ZSG-DEA) model was employed to examine allocation equality. The empirical results indicated that the countries with higher efficiency would have to increase their emission allowances. The majority of investigated countries with lower rankings in the initial allowances were likely to be less developed countries. Accordingly, these less developed countries would have to decrease their emission allowances in order to be more realistic and compliant regarding allowance allocations.

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Opis fizyczny



  • Department of Economics, Soochow University, No. 56, Sec. 1, Kuei-yang, Taipei, 100, Taiwan
  • Department of Humanities and Social Science, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, Taiwan
  • Department of Leisure and Recreation Management, Kainan University, Taiwan
  • Department of Economics, Soochow University, Taiwan


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